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a b s t r a c t 
In network security, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks target network systems with the aim of making them 
unreachable. Last generation threats are particularly dangerous because they can be carried out with very 
low resource consumption by the attacker. In this paper we propose SlowDrop, an attack characterized 
by a legitimate-like behavior and able to target different protocols and server systems. The proposed at- 
tack is the first slow DoS threat targeting Microsoft IIS, until now unexploited from other similar attacks. 
We properly describe the attack, analyzing its ability to target arbitrary systems on different scenarios, 
by including both wired and wireless connections, and comparing the proposed attack to similar threats. 
The obtained results show that by executing targeted attacks, SlowDrop is successful both against con- 
ventional servers and Microsoft IIS, which is closed source and required us the execution of so called 
“network level reverse engineering” activities. Due to its ability to successfully target different servers on 
different scenarios, the attack should be considered an important achievement in the slow DoS field. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 









































a  1. Introduction 
The Internet is today used in almost every corner of the world,
providing important benefits to its users and enhancing their lives
reducing distances between individuals through communication.
Due to a large scale adoption, its infrastructure and systems are
often target of cyber-criminals. Internet users are indeed exposed
to several security and privacy issues [20] . This exposure also has
an enormous impact on critical infrastructures, national strategic
assets whose incapacity or destruction would compromise public
safety and security, leading to possible loss of humans life or so-
cial unrest. Such systems are expected to become increasingly de-
pendent on Internet services [3] and exposures to emergent cyber-
threats should not be underestimated. In particular, the network
security field is nowadays threatened by several types of intrusive
mechanisms [1] , designed for different aims and targeting users or
the network infrastructure itself. 
In the cyber-security context, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
represent one of the most important intrusive technique to online
systems [59] . These attacks severely compromise the availability of
a network node, like a single host, a server, a network router, or
even an entire network. First generation attacks were designed to∗ Corresponding author. 






1389-1286/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uither exploit particular vulnerabilities or flood the targeted system
ith huge amount of useless packets [52] . Under a DoS condition,
hat may last from a few minutes to even several days, users trying
o communicate with the affected systems are not able to properly
nteract with them. In virtue of this, serious damages are caused
ot only to targeted services and organizations, but also to users
hemselves. 
Although both exploit-based and flood-based threats are nowa-
ays considered dangerous, various protection systems have been
rovided during the years [2,23,40,42,48] . Nevertheless, last gener-
tion threats, known as Slow DoS Attacks (SDA) [8] , low-rate DoS
LBR DoS, or LDoS) [26] , or application DoS attacks [57] , are more
ifficult to counter [30,37,60] , since they represent a mixed cate-
ory of threats inheriting characteristics of both exploit-based and
ood-based approaches. Although they make use of tiny amount
f network bandwidth, SDA effects are similar to other attacks (i.e.
ood-based), since they are able to successfully obtain a DoS state
n the targeted systems. This is often possible due to the direct
ommunication with the listening application daemon, instead of
orking only at the transport or network layer [8] . By targeting at
 higher layer of the ISO/OSI model, resources needed to carry out
n attack are reduced, due to the reduction of the number of si-
ultaneous connections a daemon is able to handle [8] . In virtue
f this, an attack can be carried out even by non powerful devices,
uch as small sized computers like Raspberry PI, network routers,
r even mobile devices like smartphones or tablets [5,10] . nder the CC BY-NC-ND license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ) 


































































































































a  With the aim of protecting network systems from denial of ser-
ice threats, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) represent today an
ssential element of the network security field, designed and con-
gured to efficiently detect attacks. Exploit-based threats are usu-
lly mitigated through signature-based IDS approaches [2] , extrap-
lating prepared patterns of known menaces to efficiently detect
nd block them. Instead, flood-based attacks protection systems
re typically based on anomaly detection models [47] , analyzing
he behavior of measurable characteristics and comparing it to a
ormal behavior. If a significant deviation from normal behavior
s detected, an alarm is raised. For instance, a common feature
dopted for detecting flood-based attacks exploits the changes sta-
istically introduced by the attack in the network traffic flow [47] .
hese changes may affect several different parameters, such as the
ype/size of packets, the number of connections over the time, or
he rate of packets associated with a particular communication
rotocol. Instead, concerning Slow DoS Attacks, although promis-
ng IDSs have been designed [30] , an efficient detection system is
urrently missing, due to not only the novelty of such menaces, but
lso to the their behavior which is similar to the one of legitimate
ituations [8] . Therefore, slow DoS threats are today considered ex-
remely dangerous and not mitigated in practice. 
In this paper, we introduce an innovative Slow DoS Attack
alled SlowDrop. While most of the known SDA exploit specific
erver side timeouts [8] , SlowDrop simulates a legitimate situation
nvolving several nodes communicating with the server through an
nreliable network connection. This behavior makes the proposed
enace more difficult to counter. 
Although the proposal of a novel threat may be unusual, we
elieve that knowing in advance offensive tools is fundamental in
rder to properly design efficient detection and mitigation systems.
he proposed work should therefore not be considered as the re-
ease of a tool for cyber-criminals, but instead an essential resource
or the network security world, providing researchers an important
lement to properly investigate the denial of service phenomenon. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reports
he related work on the topic. The proposed SlowDrop attack is
escribed in Section 3 , analyzing in detail how the attack works.
ppropriate tests of the offensive tool are reported in Section 4 .
ection 5 introduces instead protection systems and methodologies
or SlowDrop. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and proposes
uture work on the topic. 
. Related work 
Since their appearance, Slow DoS Attacks have attracted re-
earchers around the globe for different purposes. Although many
orks are focused on proposing mathematical models to repre-
ent SDAs [15,56] , categorize them [8,9] , analyze [21,41] or model
52] their behavior, other studies are focused on developing novel
hreats, such as the Shrew [26] , LoRDAS [16] or Slow Next [10] , or
o design appropriate protection mechanisms, based on signature
xtraction [28] , statistical analysis of network traffic [31] , cluster-
ng [38] or machine learning approaches [30,53] . 
Historically, low-rate DoS attacks were first proposed as the
hrew attack, designed to exploit the TCP retransmission timeout
echanism, throttling TCP flows to a small fraction of their ideal
ate to cause intermittent packet losses [26,33,51] . Zhang et al.
58] and Schuchard et al. [39] demonstrate how an attacker can
aunch a Slow DoS Attack on BGP routing sessions for compro-
ising stability and network reachability of the Internet backbone.
ore recently, researchers examined the exposure to low-rate at-
acks from other applications such as Internet services [34,35] , load
alancers [36] , wireless networks [50] , or peer-to-peer networks
55] . Guirguis et al. prove that a low-rate attack can force a feed-
ack control system to oscillate between the desired state and an-ther state. The authors analyzed the effect of such attack on a
eb server [34,35] . 
Concerning slow DoS threats, web servers represent in general a
articularly exploited typology of services exploiting specific time-
ut implementations of network servers. Macià-Fernàndez et al.
roposed a threat called Low Rate DoS attack against Application
ervers (LoRDAS), in which the attacker tries to estimate/foresee
he instants when resources are going to be freed by the server
17] , in order to seize them before any legitimate client can. Such
reliminary estimations are exploited to concentrate short burst of
ew connection requests to specific periods, with the aim of seiz-
ng available connections on the server as soon as they are released
14–16] . 
Considering other threats exploiting specific servers timeout,
lowloris is considered the most known menace [27] , most prob-
bly as a consequence of its adoption by the Anonymous group
f hacktivists executing cyber-attacks in opposition of the 2009
ranian presidential elections [54] . The attack works by sending
ncomplete requests to the server. Similar attacks are Slow HTTP
OST [18] , also known as RUDY, varying sent payload to hinder
etection systems, and SlowReq [29] , proposed by our research
roup, an attack also implemented for mobile devices under the
ame of SlowDroid [11] , reducing required bandwidth at mini-
um. Unlike these threats, working at the application layer, the
roposed SlowDrop targets the listening application daemon by
orking at lower layers. 
Another well-known threat is Slow Read, designed to force the
erver to slowing down the responses [22] . The attack exploits the
resp parameter [8] , related to the duration of the responses of a
equest over TCP. In this case, the aim of the attacker is to seize
onnections as long as possible, by inducing the server to take long
ime to send the entire response to the client. The resp parame-
er identifies in fact the time passing between the start of a re-
ponse and the end of the same response. Under a Slow Read at-
ack, such parameter assumes long values. The approach exploited
y the proposed attack is similar to Slow Read one: indeed, as Slow
ead, SlowDrop exploits server response. Nevertheless, the tech-
ique adopted by SlowDrop is based on dropping selected packets,
nstead of simulating a low reception buffer [8,22] . Another attack
imilar to the one we propose is Sockstress, designed to reduce
CP window size to slow down (even indefinitely) the communi-
ation [43] . Unlike Sockstress, the proposed threat is not bounded
o specific flags or data of the TCP protocol. In addition, since an
xtremely low (or null) window size may be easily flagged as an
nomaly, thus making the attack mitigated in practice, we believe
hat SlowDrop’s approach is more difficult to detect as malicious,
ecause it simulates potentially legitimate situations. This charac-
eristic, followed by SlowDrop, is also shared by Slow Next, a low-
ate attack we have proposed in a previous work [9] . Like Slowloris
r Slow Read, Slow Next exploits a specific server timeout, known
n this case as next [8] and identifying the time passing between
he end of a response and the start of the next request on the
ame connection stream. Being this exploitation accepted by many
TCP based) protocols supporting persistent connections (for in-
tance, HTTP 1.1, SMTP, SSH), Slow Next presents a behavior par-
icularly similar to a legitimate one, since it is expected that a le-
itimate user attends some seconds, or even minutes (for instance,
n case of SSH), before sending an additional request/message to
he server. Indeed, unlike other slow DoS threats, by analyzing
low Next payload directed to the application daemon and pack-
ts sending times during the attack, the behavior is compliant to
he protocol and it is not trivial to distinguish a malicious behav-
or from a legitimate one [9] . SlowDrop presents some similarities
ith Slow Next, since our aim here is to mimic the behavior of
 legitimate client connected through a poor network link, hence,
 particular but legitimate behavior is reproduced by the attack.



































































































1 This is not true for 3G and 4G connections, since the radio link protocol makes 
sure that packets arrive at the other end in the same order that they are received. In fact, although the behavior during a SlowDrop attack may be
associated to a common client, potentially, it is particularly diffi-
cult for the application to identify an anomaly. Such identification
would indeed lead to a potential drop of lawful connections. In ad-
dition, to the best of our knowledge, the proposed Slow DoS Attack
represents one of the first application layer threat able to target
Microsoft IIS web servers. Being the proposed attack a slow DoS
attack affecting Microsoft IIS, this ability makes SlowDrop an inno-
vative cyber-threat, although a wide variety of well-known attacks
against Microsoft IIS are available. Such threats exploit different
approaches and vulnerabilities of IIS, such as buffer overflow [6] ,
worm spreading [7] , or exploit based DoS attacks like the recent
vulnerability in IIS’s HTTP protocol stack (HTTP.sys) with codename
MS15-034 [19] . 
Attacks like Slowloris are almost ineffective against Microsoft
web servers, since such threats are designed to seize all available
connections the server is able to simultaneously serve. Since IIS
is able to potentially manage thousands of connections simultane-
ously (against a few hundreds of Apache, for instance), a DoS state
can’t be reached through this approach. Although SlowDrop ’s ap-
proach is unchanged when targeting, e.g. , an Apache web server,
when attacking a different web server (like Microsoft IIS), instead,
the attack behavior leads to an overload of the buffer resources of
the server, thus potentially leading to the DoS. For instance, it may
be needed to establish less than 100 connections with the server
to exploit its weaknesses. We believe that these different effects
caused by SlowDrop make the proposed threat unique in its kind.
In addition, the proposed threat leads to the possibility to define
a novel subcategory of Slow DoS Attacks specifically designed to
simulate particular legitimate behaviors, including existent threats
such as Slow Read, due to its simulation of a client with reduced
buffers [8,22] , and Slow Next, in virtue of its behavior, accepted by
a protocol supporting persistent connections [9] . Due to its nature,
the SlowDrop attack we introduce in this paper represents there-
fore an innovative Slow DoS Attack and it should be considered an
important advance in the cyber-security field. 
3. The SlowDrop attack 
SlowDrop is focused on the exploitation of TCP based proto-
cols and the attack emulates a client connected through an un-
reliable connection channel, such as a weak wireless connection.
Since this exploitation simulates a legitimate user, the concept be-
hind SlowDrop is similar to the one of Slow Next [9] , a Slow DoS
Attack simulating a legitimate user, by sending a legitimate request
to the targeted server, hence receiving the related response, and
finally exploiting the next parameter [8] before sending an addi-
tional request on the same connection stream. If we analyse a per-
sistent TCP connection, the client is allowed to use the same com-
munication channel for multiple subsequent requests. In this case,
as previously anticipated, the next parameter identifies the time
passed between the end of a response and the beginning of the
next request, on the same connection stream. During such time,
known as Wait Timeout [8] , the attacker does not send any data
to the server (on the same connection stream). By adopting such
behavior, if communication is analyzed, the next parameter it-
self assumes values higher than usual [9] . When repeated on many
connections, this behavior may lead to a denial of service on the
victim, since all connections manageable by the listening daemon
process are seized by the attacker and additional clients are not
able to properly communicate with the server. An exhaustive de-
scription of the Slow Next behavior can be found in [9] . 
By analyzing Slow Next, it is characterized by legitimate traf-
fic, both at the network and application layer, exchanged between
the attacker and the victim. In addition, it may not be easy to
flag its timeout exploitation as suspicious, since legitimate clientsay behave similarly, e.g. similar next values may be related to
 fair client parsing a web page before requesting an internal re-
ource. Therefore, the attack simulates particular scenarios a legit-
mate client could experience. 
On the same concept, the SlowDrop attack simulates a set of
lients associated to unreliable connections. In this case, the resp 
arameter is exploited, related to the time required to send the
esponse to the client [8] . In particular, as depicted in Fig. 1 , the
dea behind SlowDrop is to repeatedly request a specific (possible
arge, due to fragmentation needs) resource to the server, hence
ropping received packets. This packet discarding action may occur
n several legitimate cases like on a weak wireless connection. 
In particular, we define R the packets dropping ratio, 0 ≤ R < 1 ,
here R = 0 implies a legitimate situation (no packets are dis-
arded), while R = 1 , not considered, implies that all packets are
ropped. Let M − 1 be the number of discarded packets before ac-
epting a single packet, Fig. 1 reports R = 1 − 1 M . In general, math-
matically speaking, M > 0 must be satisfied. Therefore, accepted
ackets are indexed (by arrival order) kM + 1 , with k ≥ 0 . 
Considering the taxonomy reported in [8,9] , SlowDrop may be
onsidered a threat exploiting the resp parameter. As many oth-
rs Slow DoS Attacks, SlowDrop approach is to directly target the
istening application daemon. In particular, packets dropping is ap-
lied only on packets including application layer data. 
It should be noted that a “smart” attack may accept packets by
onsidering sequence numbers ordering. In this case, a packet may
e accepted, for instance, by considering its sequence number, to
e subsequent to the sequence number of the previously accepted
acket. Nevertheless, since SlowDrop simulates an unreliable con-
ection link, this “smart” acceptance is not implemented. Indeed,
f we consider for instance a poor wireless connection, received
ackets order may not be driven by their sequence numbers, but
nstead by network connection characteristics 1 
.1. Effects of the attack 
If we analyze a single connection, in general, a connection is
ypically seized for the entire resource transfer operation. Con-
idering the SlowDrop attack, although it may be thought that a
E. Cambiaso, G. Chiola and M. Aiello / Computer Networks 150 (2019) 234–249 237 






































































































p  acket discard leads to high retransmission rates, in practice the
erver would interpret the packet loss as a communication prob-
em, hence extending connection seizing times. Therefore, induced
ackets retransmission and sending slow-down [32] may lead a
ulnerable server to long connection resources occupations. This
haracteristic is shared with many other Slow DoS Attacks [8] . Al-
hough the packet discarding activity may not be necessary, in this
ase it is accomplished not only to enlarge resources occupation
imings, but also to reduce the network bandwidth required for
he transfer. This reduction leads the server to maintain the con-
ections alive, until the transfer is completed. For R values tending
o 1, SlowDrop may theoretically postpone the completion to ex-
remely long times. In practice, an appropriate trade-off is needed
o avoid server side connection closures. This R trade-off is needed
n order to efficiently exploit servers resources. Although R val-
es tending to 1 theoretically lead to extremely long seizings, in
ractice the server may interrupt the connection. In Fig. 2 , it is
eported the behavior of a generic slow DoS attacker 2 targeting a
etwork service, from a single connection point of view. 
According to the figure, we assume that the attack begins at the
nstant 0 . After some seconds, reported in Fig. 2 as T establish = T 1 start ,
 connection is established with the server. The aim of the attacker
s usually to reduce to a minimum this time [12] , hence connec-
ions are often established at the beginning of the malicious ac-
ivity. This is not always true: for instance, in case of a server ap-
lying limits to clients connection rate. Data transfer is then ac-
omplished, if needed, according to the adopted attack strategy.
ssuming the victim identifies some sort of anomalous behavior,
r in general a connection closure activity is triggered, the server
nterrupts/closes the established connection. This closure is often
pplied at server-side. Nevertheless, in some cases a client-side
losure may be preferable [14] . Assuming a server-side closure, ac-
ording to the figure, it is accomplished at time T 1 
end 
. Hence, con-
ection established duration is T seizing = T 1 end − T 1 start . 
Identifying a connection closure takes some time to the at-
acker, ranging from a few seconds, even to some minutes in the
orst cases, depending on the implementation of the threat. Once
he closure is detected, the attacker usually instantiates a new con-
ection with the victim, with the aim of seizing the resource again
efore any legitimate client does. According to Fig. 2 , attacker side
onnection closure detection time is T detect = T 2 start − T 1 end . Although
ot always true [16] , it is in general important for the attacker to
educe T detect values at a minimum, in order to quickly seize re-
ources again once a closure is identified. Duration T seizing of all
he established connections typically assumes similar values, since
t is often related to a specific server side timeout [8] . In the next
ection we will try to estimate the T seizing value. 
.2. Connection seizing duration 
We will now estimate the T seizing duration of a single connec-
ion, during a SlowDrop attack. Let’s assume a resource r sized S ′ ( r )
ytes is requested by the attacker. Fragmentation of the resource
perated at levels lower than the application one leads the server




dditional lower layers payloads (i.e. TCP or IP), S ′ ( r ) < P ( r ) S ( r ), al-
hough in the same order of magnitude. 
We define B the attacker reception bandwidth, in terms of bytes
er second. We assume a packet discard ratio equal to R , according
o the definition above. 
We define P effective ( r ) the number of packets the server effec-
ively sends during a SlowDrop attack to completely transfer the
equested resource r to the client, according to Eq. (1) . 
 effective (r) = 
P (r) 
1 − R (1) 
According to Eq. (2) , we also define Q the number of packets
er second the communication channel can tolerate for the trans-
er of r , in proportion to the bandwidth capability. 
(r) = B 
S(r) 
(2) 
Hence, an estimation of the T seizing seizing time in seconds of
lowDrop for a single connection (regarding the transfer of the r
esource) is reported in Eq. (3) . 
 seizing (r)  
P effective (r) 
Q(r) 
= P (r) S(r) 
B (1 − R ) (3) 
For simplicity, since we focus on the application layer, we do
ot consider some additional packets, such as those of the re-
uest, the 3-way-handshake, or exchanged ACK messages. Also, we
o not model congestion and flow control algorithms. Neverthe-
ess, in case of high R values, the connection will be closed by the
erver, hence requiring the attacker to establish a new connection,
ence, to accomplish a new 3-way-handshake. Instead, concerning
CK messages, since SlowDrop focuses on packet discarding, some
ackets will not be received during an attack, hence, ACK mes-
ages received by the server will contain different (usually, lower)
cknowledge number values than in case of a normal connection.
his would require from one side a client retransmission of unre-
eived packets, but it will also keep the connection alive for longer
eriods, also considering flow control algorithms, that in case of a
lowDrop attack would lead to a bandwidth reduction. 
In addition, our estimation assumes all accepted packets are
onsumed by the client: for instance, instead, the client may re-
eive and drop a packet with a wrong sequence number. In this
ase, T seizing value may increase. 
.3. The packets dropping approach 
As already mentioned, SlowDrop simulates a situation involv-
ng unreliable clients. In order to properly simulate such environ-
ent, the client host should not receive/interpret dropped pack-
ts, since packets reception may induce him to send related ACK
ackets to the victim, (wrongly) specifying a correct data recep-
ion. Our aim is instead to avoid such behavior, making the client
pplication believe that packets have not arrived at all. Although
t could be possible to selectively drop ACK packets directed to
he victim, hence making the victim erroneously believe that sent
ackets have not reached their destination, this behavior would not
orrectly simulate an unreliable connection. A more accurate ap-
roach is therefore needed. The adopted method involves instead
he drop of packets before they are parsed/interpreted by the client,
hus maintaining an affinity with the behavior associated to an un-
eliable connection. 






















































































































r  In general, in order to drop packets before they are interpreted
by the client application, two possible approaches are possible:
(i) to drop packets before they reach the destination , for instance
through a apposite network devices (like a firewall or a network
tap), or (ii) to drop packets on the destination host before they are
interpreted by the application . Of course, in case of network propa-
gation of the packets, the overall network will be affected from the
injected packets. Nevertheless, in the context of a SlowDrop attack,
both the approaches lead to similar results, since the aim is to pre-
vent interpretation from the server application. 
3.4. Limits of SlowDrop 
The SlowDrop attack presents two important limits. As speci-
fied above, a weak aspect of the proposed threat is represented by
the resource size . Since transport layer fragmentation is exploited
by SlowDrop, the attack is unsuccessful in case of low-sized re-
sponses. In particular, in order to exploit fragmentation, the size of
the requested resource should be higher than the data carried out
by a packet sized equal to the maximum segment size [32] . In this
context, in order to bypass this limit of SlowDrop, further work on
the topic may be directed to deeply investigate the behavior of the
server when low-sized resources are requested by the attacker. 
Another limit is represented by the transport protocol : the pro-
posed threat is designed to only work over specific transport layer
protocols (such as TCP) supporting packets retransmission. Consid-
ering for instance unreliable protocols, such as UDP, a packet loss
does not induce a server side packet retransmission. Although this
characteristic limits the range of exploitable services, many slow
DoS threats are bounded to TCP-like protocols as well [8] . 
4. Executed tests and obtained results 
In this section we focus on the tests we have executed to val-
idate the effectiveness of SlowDrop. Our tests have been executed
with the following aims: (i) to identify proper attack parameters,
(ii) to analyze the effects of SlowDrop on a targeted server, (iii) to
analyze SlowDrop performance on different network scenarios, (iv)
to analyze the ability of SlowDrop to target different server appli-
cations, and (v) to compare SlowDrop to other similar threats. 
With reference to the packets dropping approaches reported in
Section 3.3 , although effects of both the approaches are equiva-
lent, we directly work on the attacking host, filtering and drop-
ping packets before they are interpreted. This choice allows us to
make use of a single malicious machine to execute the attack. In
particular, on Linux based systems, it’s possible to intercept net-
work packets through iptables [45] , a software allowing system ad-
ministrators to directly configure the tables provided by the Linux
kernel firewall. The attacking host has been configured to forward
selected packets to the user-space, for processing. This is possible
by using the NFQUEUE target [24] of Linux iptables packet filter.
Packets processing is possible by interfacing to the packets’ queue
through apposite programming libraries, available in different lan-
guages. Adopted programming language used for the development
of the filter is Python and related library is python-nfqueue . 
4.1. Identifying proper R values and resource sizes 
Standing to our statement reported in Section 3.4 , the attack
success depends on the size of the requested resource. Consider-
ing that, a first test set has been focused on identifying an appro-
priate size for the requested resource. Although a resource bigger
than the maximum segment size [32] may be sufficient, by fixing
T = 600 seconds the duration of each considered test, we focus on
identifying the minimum size of the resource able to maintain con-ections alive (hence preventing server side closures) for at least T
econds. Our aim is therefore to adopt T seizing ≥ T . 
As described in Section 3.2 , T seizing value directly depends on
esource size and R . By fixing the resource size to a large sized
le (adopted file size is about 700MB), we have to find a proper
alue of R . This value is found by iterating over possible values
f R and opening a single connection with the server, with the
im of identifying R max the maximum value of R before a server
ide connection closure is detected within T seconds. We focus on
he maximum value, instead of the minimum, since reducing the
umber of packets accepted by the server, bandwidth is reduced
oo. Therefore, we expect in general to save more bandwidth using
igher R values. Nevertheless, as previously explained, extremely
igh values may lead to server side connections closures. Although
 server side closure may induce the attacker to establish newer
onnections with the server, for our tests it is not important to
uickly identify the closure, since our goal here is to retrieve ap-
ropriate R values. 
During our tests we have involved a single attacking host tar-
eting a Linux based web server running Apache2 web server. Both
he machines are connected through a high speed LAN connection.
Concerning the identification of R max , Fig. 3 reports results ob-
ained considering single connections with the victim by varying R
etween 0 and 1 (due to the considerations reported in Section 3 ,
 = 1 has been excluded), adopting an increasing step equal to
.02, hence considering 50 different scenarios. The adopted step
s not able to provide the real R max value of our selected scenario,
ut it allows us to identify a neighborhood of that value. Once a
losure is detected, no new connections are established with the
erver. Shown results are related to bandwidth requirements, an-
lyzed on the attacking host. Fig. 3 also highlights connections
losed by the server within T seconds. 
It’s possible to notice how attacker bandwidth usage directly
epends on the R value: by increasing the dropping ratio, the over-
ll attack bandwidth decreases. A first result is related to resource
ize: in the most bandwidth expensive case, with R = 0 . 0 , overall
andwidth usage is about 2.193 · 10 6 bits per second, hence equal
o a total of 157 MB exchanged from the client and the server,
uring T = 600 seconds. Therefore, since the requested resource is
igger than effectively exchanged bandwidth, it should be consid-
red in this case a good resource. 
In addition, tests show how bandwidth is significantly reduced
y passing from R = 0 . 24 to R = 0 . 30 . Therefore, a first good R max
election may be to adopt R max ≥ 0.30. In order to identify the best
alue, according to our scenario, we have to analyze performance
or greater R values. In particular, for R > 0.90, since server side
ackets reception is hindered, as a consequence of the client side
ata dropping, connections are closed by the server, hence, we ob-
ain T seizing < T . Nevertheless, as bandwidth directly depends on the
 value, in general decreasing with the increase of R , our final se-
ection is R max = 0 . 90 . 
By adopting R = 0 . 90 and fixing T = 600 seconds, our aim is
ow to identify a proper resource size, in order of avoiding trans-
er completion within T seconds. We define r min the minimum
mounts of bytes the requested resources has to be composed of,
n order to seize a connection for at least T seconds. In particular,
ccording to Fig. 3 , measured overall bandwidth rate for R max =
 . 90 is about 2.5kbps for a duration of T seconds, corresponding
o an object sized 192 KB. Therefore, we identify an average r min 
alue as r min = 192 KB. This value is not accurate, since it also in-
ludes the request, the response headers, and non application layer
ackets and payloads. Nevertheless, effective resource size r min sat-
sfies the equation r min < r min . Therefore, any size equal or higher
o r min is good for our purpose, including the adopted large size
f about 700 MB. Indeed, is important to notice that in this case
esource size does not affect attack performance: resource size di-
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the daemon software. 
3 Regarding the TimeOut directive of Apache2, more information are available at 
the following address: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#timeout . ectly depends on the adopted T and R values, but once an r min 
ize has been found, each value greater or equal to r min is good.
n particular, according to our definition in Section 3 , by choosing
 ≥ r min , for R = R max we always expect to obtain T seizing ≥ T . 
.2. SlowDrop Effects on the targeted server 
Adopting the R and resource size values identified in the previ-
us section, we have targeted an Apache2 web server with Slow-
rop. The victim server has been configured to serve at most
 max = 256 simultaneous connections. This value represents the
aximum value for Apache2 web server [49] , while default value
s equal to 150. Higher values are possible only by adopting and
onfiguring appropriate additional software modules. 
During our test, we have configured SlowDrop to establish N max 
imultaneous connections with the victim. Similarly to other Slow
oS Attacks, such as Slowloris [27] , SlowDroid [11] , or Slow Next
9] , this behavior leads the attacker to seize all the available con-
ections on the server, thus causing a denial of service. According
o previous findings, we have adopted R = 0 . 90 and a request size
ble to allow us to maintain the connections seized for the entire
ttack duration, equal to T = 600 s. 
Fig. 4 reports obtained results, analyzing on the targeted server
he amount of established connections over the time. 
In this case, the total amount of bandwidth required to the at-
ack is equal to 652 Kbps. Our results show that the attack is suc-
essful, because all available connections are seized by the attacker,
hus causing a DoS on the targeted server. In particular, according
o the parameters introduced in Section 3.1 , we have measured a
aximum T establish value equal to 26, as the DoS condition occurs
fter 26 seconds from the instant the attack starts. Nevertheless,
y deeply analyzing the number of connections, a single connec-
ion is closed by the server after about 593 seconds since the be-
inning of the capture, hence leading to a T seizing time lower than
he overall attack duration T . Under these conditions, the victim is
ble to serve a legitimate client (a single connection, in particu-
ar) communicating with the server. This situation has been con-
rmed through additional tests, executed for different R > 0 valuesnd times, in which we have also observed that considering longer
imes, the number of connections involved in the closure slowly
ncreases. 
This behavior derives in particular from the TimeOut directive 3 
f Apache2. This directive defines the amount of time the server
ill wait for certain events before failing a request. In particular,
hen writing data to the client, the TimeOut directive defines the
ength of time to wait for an acknowledgment of a packet when
he send buffer is full. During our tests we have adopted a time-
ut equal to T O = 300 seconds, which represents the default value.
ue to the randomness of packets receiving (hence dropping), the
imeout may be triggered at any time, after 300 seconds from the
eginning of each connection. In addition, it may refer to each con-
ection. 
Although this represents a limit of SlowDrop, it is simple for
he attacker to identify a connection closure and re-instantiate the
onnection, hence maintaining the DoS over the time. Moreover,
 different attack may send acknowledgments after about TO sec-
nds, or, similarly, apply an acceptance delay of about TO seconds. 
.3. SlowDrop Performance on different network scenarios 
Tests considered in the previous section refer to an attacker be-
onging to the same (LAN) network of the victim: the local network
f our institute. In order to analyze attack behavior on real condi-
ions, we have to consider different network types. In this context,
e have considered two test cases, respectively related to wired
nd wireless networks. Due to the results obtained above, for this
est set we have adopted R = 0 . 90 . Instead, in this case the victim
erver has been configured to serve at most N max = 150 simulta-
eous connections. As mentioned, this value represents the default
alue of Apache2 web server, preconfigured after the installation of
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b  4.3.1. Wired network tests 
Concerning wired networks, we have considered three situa-
tions: 
• LAN network , placing the attacker on the same network of the
victim (as previously considered); 
• WAN network , placing the attacker on the same wide area net-
work of the victim, on the network of our university. In particu-
lar, the adopted network is commonly known as GARR network
and it represents the Italian Research & Education Network 4 ; 
• Internet network , placing the attacker on a global Internet host,
connected through an ADSL connection. 
In all the considered situations, the victim server has been
placed on the network of our research institute. Connection/link
speeds measured during the tests are the following: 925 Mbps in
the LAN scenario, 93.8 Mbps for the WAN one, and 321 Kbps for
the Internet test case. 
Obtained results are shown in Fig. 5 , showing that for all the
considered scenarios the DoS state is reached after a few seconds
since the beginning of the attack, as all the N max = 150 connections
are seized by the attacker. 
Although results for the LAN scenario are similar to the pre-
vious ones, in this case the DoS is maintained for the entire at-
tack duration. This result derives from the randomness of the net-
work communications: for instance, the TCP protocol implementa-
tion may close connections related to a missing reception of proper
sequence numbers. We therefore expect that for longer execution
times, connections are “slowly” closed by the server. On the other
cases, instead, a partial number of connections is closed after about
300 seconds since the beginning of the attack. While for the WAN
scenario, the closure only affects 110 connections, concerning the
Internet tests, all the connections are closed. 4 Further information concerning the GARR network are available at the following 





s  .3.2. Wireless network tests 
In this case, the communication with the server is established
hrough a wireless network. We have considered in particular
hree network types: 
• Wi-Fi network , placing the attacker on the same local net-
work of the victim and connecting the attacker to the network
through a wireless access point; 
• 4G/LTE network , connecting the attacker to the Internet through
a 4G/LTE mobile network. 
• 3G/HSPA network , connecting the attacker to the Internet
through a 3G based High Speed Packet Access (HSPA) mobile
network; 
Connection/link speeds measured during the tests are the fol-
owing: 60.4Mbps in the Wi-Fi scenario, 23.3Mbps for the 4G one,
nd 1.19Mbps for the 3G test case. 
Obtained results are shown in Fig. 6 , showing that the attack
s always successful: all the N max = 150 connections have been es-
ablished by the attacker and are kept active during the time, thus
eading to a DoS on the targeted server. 
Nevertheless, as experienced in the results reported on
ection 4.2 , some of the established connections are closed. Al-
hough this closure does not affects the LAN case, characterized
y T seizing values greater than the overall attack duration T , and it
arginally affects the Wi-Fi case, where attacker and victim belong
re part of the same LAN network, in case of a mobile connection,
fter about 300 seconds, all connections are closed. 
.3.3. Network type results discussion 
Analyzing the results we have obtained, it should be clear
hat attack performance differ by varying the typology of network
dopted. The difference we have observed is in particular associ-
ted to the quality of the network connection: since SlowDrop may
e seen as an attack that simulates a poor wireless connection link,
ssociated to high packet losses, depending on the nature of the
etwork, packet losses may be less frequent on a LAN wired con-
ection, instead of on other scenarios that may be characterized
y packet losses (e.g. due to limited radio coverage on a wireless
cenario). Therefore, in order to execute an efficient attack, it is
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Fig. 5. Attack Effects on an Apache2 Web Server by Communicating through a Wired Network and Adopting R = 0 . 90 . 
























e  undamental to adapt the R value according to the network char-
cteristics. 
Regarding wireless tests, instead, it is also important to consider
he quality of the connection link (signal strength, collisions, etc.).
ince the access point used for Wi-Fi (over LAN) tests was in prox-
mity of the attacking network, packet losses are reduced. On the
ontrary, connection quality in case of mobile network tests was
imited, especially for LTE connectivity, most probably because as-
ociated to low signal strength during the tests. Analogously to the
ired situation, by reducing wireless connection quality, effective R
alue is implicitly increased, thus increasing packet closure possi-
ility. Therefore, also in this case it is important to choose a proper value. Nevertheless, since wireless connection characteristics de-
end on many factors (proximity to the cell, network load, inter-
erences, etc.), it may be extremely difficult to identify an optimal
 value. 
Although connection closures have been experienced during the
ests, we have preferred to maintain a common R value, in order
o analyze different results for different networks, executing the at-
ack with common parameters. We have obtained that the R packet
ropping ratio value depends on the characteristics of the adopted
etwork. In particular, by decreasing the performance of the net-
ork link, it is fundamental to reduce the R value accordingly. Nev-
rtheless, it should be noted that the attack is always successful






















































































































5 More information about Microsoft IIS connections limits are available at the 
following address: https://www.iis.net/configreference/system.applicationhost/sites/ 
site/limits . and independent from the network bandwidth available to the at-
tacker. Moreover, an optimized attack may adopt (or set up) Slow-
Drop’s approach to reduce needed bandwidth, hence re-establish
connections once a server-side closure is detected. In this case the
DoS state would be indefinitely maintained. In virtue of these con-
siderations, SlowDrop should be considered an extremely danger-
ous threat, not only for its deployment over different communica-
tion systems, but also for its adaptation to the network. 
Considering a better R value choice, we have for instance identi-
fied that by choosing R = 0 . 80 , hence a lower R value, for the WAN
scenario, performances are similar to the LAN case: no connections
are closed in this case within T = 600 seconds. Therefore, choosing
a good R value is crucial not only to reduce network bandwidth
requirements, but also to enhance the performance of the attack.
Further work on the topic may be focused on an accurate dynamic
identification of R values, independently from the characteristics of
the adopted communication medium. 
4.4. IIS Servers affection 
Slow DoS Attacks are able to successfully cause a DoS on a
server through low bandwidth. Nevertheless, if we consider other
timeout based threats [9] like Slowloris, SlowReq, Slow Read, or
Slow Next, the range of potential victims does not include widely
adopted server systems. Indeed, existent timeout based threats are
often designed to target open source software, such as Apache,
Squid, or common FTP servers. Among all the servers such threats
can’t exploit, Microsoft systems could represent the most impor-
tant unexploited servers. This limit comes from the (mentioned
above) approach of other timeout based DoS attacks, seizing all
possible simultaneous connections on the victim, thus depriving
legitimate clients to access the server. This approach leads to suc-
cessful results on many typologies of servers. Moreover, the “open
implementation” limit is reasonable, since open source software
is easier to understand and, as a consequence, server’s behavior
is simpler to analyze and foresee. Nevertheless, when possible, a
threat able to target a server independently from the implementa-
tion should be preferable. 
In this context, during our study on SlowDrop we have found
that its ability to target a different typology of server: Microsoft
Internet Information Server (IIS) in particular, the proprietary web
server implemented by Microsoft [25] . Being both Microsoft IIS and
Microsoft Windows (the operating system hosting IIS software)
closed source [44] , it is more difficult to accurately analyze the
server behavior. As previously mentioned, in virtue of this charac-
teristic and their wider adoption, open source systems are often
favorite by researchers and ethical hackers implementing cyber-
attacks. Nevertheless, when possible, it is important to consider
also closed source systems, especially when, as in the case of Mi-
crosoft IIS (IIS in the following), their market penetration is con-
siderable. 
Analyzing the possibility to perpetrate a SlowDrop attack
against IIS, we have found that the approach of seizing all avail-
able connections of the server can not be applied here. IIS imple-
mentation differ in fact from other software like Apache, since it
is potentially able to serve thousands of connections simultane-
ously. Indeed, preliminary tests against IIS, executed by normally
establishing thousands of connections with the server and request-
ing the default home page of IIS, showed us that the server can
successfully handle all the connections without losing in perfor-
mance. From these initial results, IIS appeared to be a particularly
resilient server. Moreover, we can state that the connections man-
agement approach of the server differs from, i.e., Apache2, and,
consequently, the attack approach should vary accordingly. We will now describe the approach we have followed to target
icrosoft IIS web server and the results we have obtained during
ur tests. 
Considered duration of each test is equal to T = 600 seconds.
uring our tests against Microsoft web server, we have configured
n IIS 8.5 server on a Microsoft Windows Server 2012 machine.
erver and attacker are connected through a LAN network. Regard-
ng the attack parameters and server configuration, we have main-
ained the same configuration which successfully leaded Apache2
o a denial of service. In particular, we have adopted R = 0 . 90 and
uring the attack each request to the server is related to a re-
ource sized about 700MB. Due to the preliminary tests results
mentioned above), a smaller resource size would make SlowDrop
neffective. 
.4.1. Same configuration considered against apache2 
Analyzing IIS configuration, it is possible to customize the
aximum number of concurrent connections. By retrieving the
efault amount, it could be possible for the attacker to estab-
ish such amount of connections, thus leading to a DoS on the
erver, through the same approach adopted against Apache2 (see
ection 4.2 ). Nevertheless, by default, such value assumes an ex-
remely high value 5 : 4294967295, equal to 2 32 − 1 . A different at-
ack approach is therefore needed, since a “slow DoS attacker”
an’t afford to establish such amount of connections. Concerning
lowDrop, the attack works by slowing down reception through
acket discarding. As reported in Section 3.4 , this activity requires
he attacker to request large resources. Therefore, even with low
mounts of connections, the attack may be successful. For instance,
n case of a not optimized implementation, a vulnerable server
ay replicate in memory the requested resource, in order to serve
t. Such approach would lead to a DoS on the server, since by re-
eatedly requesting large resources, the server would easily con-
ume its entire memory. 
Since we couldn’t measure a proper number of connections to
stablish with the server, a first test set has been accomplished by
stablishing the same (higher) amount of connections adopted for
pache2. In particular, we have established 256 connections with
he server. As for previous tests, once a connection closure occurs,
o additional connections are established with the server. Such ap-
roach is not optimal, from the attacker point of view, but it allows
s to better understand the server behavior. According to previ-
us tests, we have analyzed reachability capabilities at server side.
he attack is not successful in this case, since the DoS state is not
eached on the server. 
We have therefore decided to insert an additional HTTP
ompression header to the requests sent to the server:
ccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate . Through this header,
he client specifies the server the supported compression schemes.
articularly, data are compressed in GNU zip format, by using
he deflate algorithm. In this case, in particular, a gzip-encoded
esource may be returned as a response. Such behavior would
nduce the server to compress the (large-sized) requested re-
ource, hence leading to greater consumption of its computational
esources. Obtained results are shown in Fig. 7 . As shown, the
oS state is in this case reached and the server is not able to
erve any client. Nevertheless, we have found that the DoS state
s maintained for 187 s , instead of the entire duration of the
ttack. This makes such configuration not optimal in this context.
evertheless, we analyzed that required overall attack bandwidth
s in this case equal to 35.4Kbps. while previous tests related to
pache2 (see Section 4.2 ) reported bandwidth requirements of
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a  52Kbps. Although this is also related to a less effective threat,
andwidth requirements are in this case extremely reduced. This
s an important characteristic of a Slow DoS Attack. 
.4.2. Attack variations 
As a consequence of the results obtained previously, we have
xecuted additional tests, with minor attack configuration changes.
ariations are related to the size of the requested resource and the
dopted R value. These changes derive from the following facts: 
• according to the statements reported in Section 3.1 , the con-
nection time may depend on the resource size, since a com-
pleted transfer would normally induce the server to interrupt
the communication. Therefore, as a consequence of the connec-
tion closures identified during the tests reported in the pre-
vious section, we have analyzed attack success in case a big-
ger resource is requested. We expect that for a bigger resource,
seizing times may be longer. Since our aim is to maintain the
DoS state for the entire attack duration, we do not consider
smaller resources; 
• by adopting R = 0 . 90 , we have found that the attack is (even if
not indefinitely) successful. We have decided to use different R
values and analyze if the attack is still successful or not; 
• since the number of connections we have adopted is related to
the Apache2 configuration, providing the server the ability to
serve at most 256 simultaneous connections, we have varied
this number to analyze the success of the attack for different
connection sizes. 
ifferent size of the requested resource 
We have executed tests by requesting a resource with different
ize. File size is about 4GB, hence nearly six times bigger than pre-
iously. Obtained results are similar to the case reported in previ-
us section, related to a 700MB resource. In this case, the duration
f the DoS state is 188 seconds and attack bandwidth is equal to
8.02 Kbps. Therefore, we can state that for high resource sizes, the
ffects of the attack are almost unchanged. Regarding the tests re-
orted in the following, in order to maintain analogy with the testsonsidered so far, we have decided to adopt a 700 MB resource.
evertheless, analyzing attack bandwidth, we can state that each
le bigger than about 2.72MB is good in this context (assuming
 = 0 . 90 ) and leads to similar results. 
ifferent R value 
Since the retrieved R = 0 . 90 value has been obtained analyzing
he behavior of an Apache2 web server, a different value may be
referable when targeting IIS. Therefore, we have executed two ad-
itional tests by adopting respectively R = 0 . 10 and R = 0 . 99 . 
Concerning both the tests, we have found that results are simi-
ar to the tests related to R = 0 . 90 , although in this case bandwidth
equirements vary according to the adopted packet discarding ra-
io. In particular, regarding R = 0 . 10 tests, the DoS duration period
s equal to 226 seconds, while attack bandwidth is equal to 7.08
bps (506 MB in total). Instead, concerning R = 0 . 99 tests, the DoS
s maintained for 204 seconds and measured attack bandwidth is
qual to 30.76 Kbps (2.2 MB in total). Bandwidth results are ex-
ected, since overall attack bandwidth depends on the R value.
ince results are in line with previous findings, we can state that
y varying the R value, performance of the attack are unchanged.
his characteristic is particularly important, since results related to
pache2 attacks provided an asymmetry dependent on the net-
ork typology. We can therefore state that, unlike for Apache2,
hen targeting an IIS web server, network typology should not
e relevant for a proper identification of the R value. As a con-
equence of the considerations made in Section 4.3.3 , the “R is
etwork independent” characteristic represents a meaningful result 
nd an important feature of SlowDrop. In general, for the tests re-
orted in the following, we have adopted R = 0 . 90 . 
ifferent number of connections established during the attack 
We have executed tests by varying the number of established
onnections. In this case also, connections are not established after
losure. We have executed two different tests by establishing re-
pectively 50 and 10 0 0 connections with the server. Obtained re-
ults show that, regarding the 50 connections test, attack results
re not better than the 256 connections case. In particular, the
244 E. Cambiaso, G. Chiola and M. Aiello / Computer Networks 150 (2019) 234–249 







































































o  DoS state is maintained for just 32 seconds . Concerning the tests
on 10 0 0 connections, instead, results reported that the test is suc-
cessful and the server experiences a denial of service that is main-
tained for the entire duration of the attack. In addition, in this case
connection speed is about 22.5 Kbps and about 1.6 MB of attack
bandwidth are consumed: such tiny amount of bandwidth makes
the attack extremely dangerous. Although the reduced amount of
bandwidth may not be expected, it derives from the lack of con-
nection closures, hence from a reduced number of packets. 
Considerations 
From the tests reported in this section we have concluded
that adopted resource size, equal to 700MB, is acceptable for our
aim. Moreover, the success of the attack does not depend on the
adopted R packet discarding ratio value. Finally, the number of
connections established during the attack assumes an important
role for the success of the attack. In the next section we report
the tests executed to identify server side connection closures in
function of the adopted number of connections established by the
attacker. 
4.4.3. Monitoring DoS duration 
Tests reported previously returned interesting results by vary-
ing the number of connections established by the attacker. We
have therefore decided to analyze server status by varying con-
nection closures. Since, as mentioned, IIS is a proprietary software,
we can’t know how it works and we can’t understand in detail its
behavior. Nevertheless, we can execute some sort of network level
reverse engineering . We have decided to execute repeated tests by
varying the number of established connections, within a range of
100 to 1000. Each test has been repeated for 12 times, in order to
statistically analyze obtained data. For each test, we have measured
the duration of the DoS state, in seconds, over a total of T = 600
seconds, and the attack bandwidth. 
Fig. 8 reports DoS duration mean and standard deviation re-
trieved after the executed tests. The obtained results show that
there is not a linear relationship between the DoS duration and
the number of established connections. Moreover, variance of the
results is particularly high (in some cases, the DoS duration ex-
ceeded the measured time T ), hence, the duration of the DoS isn general dependent on many additional factors. Being IIS a pro-
rietary software, properly identifying and monitoring connection
losure triggers is not an easy task, and may be considered an ex-
ended work on the topic. 
Regarding the obtained results, we analyzed that in a few cases
about 6.67%) the attack is not successful and DoS duration is equal
o 0 seconds. Nevertheless, in general, Fig. 8 shows that the at-
ack is in average successful and that mean DoS duration is equal
o about 3 minutes, with peaks of about 9 minutes. Although re-
rieved 0 DoS durations represents ineffective executions of the at-
ack, it is easier for the attacker to detect its failure, hence take
ppropriate actions. Similarly, it is possible to identify connection
losures and establish additional connections with the aim of reach
he DoS again. 
The obtained results concerning the attack bandwidth are
hown in Fig. 9 , in terms of mean and standard deviation. As it
ay be expected, results show that attack bandwidth grows almost
inearly by increasing the number of considered connections, with
eaks of about 20Kbps. 
Analyzing the obtained results, Fig. 8 shows that the most
uccessful cases are (in average) related to 500 connections. As
 consequence, due to the considerations made in Section 4.4.2,
ig. 9 shows that in case of attack success we have a reduced band-
idth, deriving from a lack of connection closing packets. There-
ore, we can state that, in virtue of the obtained results, better re-
ults are achieved by establishing 500 connections with the server.
evertheless, since the significance of such obtained value is not
lear, further work on the topic may focus in this direction, by ex-
cuting additional experiments in order to confirm or reject our
ypothesis. 
.5. Comparison with other slow DoS attacks 
We have executed tests comparing the proposed menace to
ther timeout based DoS attacks [9] , on a real test environment
n our institute LAN. We have targeted a common Apache2 web
erver with the proposed SlowDrop, in conjunction with Slowloris,
lowReq, Slow Read, and Slow Next attacks described in Section 2 .
ince attacks like Slowloris and Slow Read are designed to target
nly the HTTP protocol [29] , we have focused on Apache2, which
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Fig. 9. Obtained Results for Different Attack Scenarios by Analyzing Attack Bandwidth When Targeting Microsoft IIS. 





















































d  epresents one of the most important services in this context. As
escribed in Section 2 , since Microsoft IIS systems are not vulnera-
le to existent low-rate attacks (except the proposed one), we have
xcluded this service as well. 
.5.1. Timeout exploiting DoS attacks 
As previously mentioned, existent slow DoS threats, known as
imeout Exploiting DoS attacks [9] , work by exploiting a specific
erver side timeout, as reported in Fig. 10 . Such an exploitation of-
en gives the attacker the ability to reduce the network bandwidth.
s reported in Fig. 10 , depicting a TCP connection stream, various
parameters may be exploited (more information are available in
9] ). For instance, since Slowloris threat exploits the req param-
ter, the connections it generates are characterized by extremely
ong requests. Instead, the proposed SlowDrop attack exploits the
resp parameter by inducing the server to take long times to send
 response resource to the client. Existent threats considered dur-
ng the tests do not consider the exploitation of start and delay 
arameters. Regarding the start parameter, as described in [9] , itas been excluded since its exploitation is similar to next one. In-
tead, concerning the delay parameter, as reported in [8] , existent
hreats are nowadays mitigated and no more effective. 
.5.2. Testbed 
During our tests, we have generated captured network traffic
n the targeted server. Each considered trial refers to a capture of
 = 600 seconds of live network traffic. Since our aim here is to
ompare the ability to carry out an attack and analyze required
andwidth for the attacker, we have considered a SlowDrop execu-
ion through a (LAN) network link associated to a limited connec-
ion speed. We have decided to limit the connection speed related
o SlowDrop since our aim here is to reduce bandwidth require-
ents for the attacker, although maintaining the ability of Slow-
rop to cause a DoS on the server, thus executing a Slow DoS At-
ack [8] . Through traffic shaping techniques, we have limited both
ownload and upload bandwidth to 10kbps. We used a discard
atio R = 0 . 90 . These values represents the best options obtained
uring preliminary tests. The bandwidth reduction choice derives
rom the results obtained in Section 4.3.3 , stating that SlowDrop
s able to adapt resources usage in function of the available net-
ork. We believe that this is an important characteristic of Slow-
rop, since it gives the client the ability to carry out an attack in-
ependently from the connection network. 
As previously mentioned in Section 3 , timeout based threats
ake use of a Wait Timeout to alternate activity periods to in-
ctivity ones, for data sending operations, with the aim of reduc-
ng attack bandwidth [8] . Instead, the proposed SlowDrop does not
ake use of such timeout, in favor of a packets dropping approach.
dopted a Wait Timeout for Slowloris, SlowReq and Slow Read is
qual to 60 seconds, which allows us to maintain the connections
live on most situations, since default Apache2 timeout is equal
o 300 seconds. Regarding the Slow Next attack, a different time-
ut is needed [9] , due to different directive of the server, equal by
efault to 5 seconds. Therefore, concerning Slow Next only, in or-
er to avoid a server side connection closure, we adopted a Wait
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Table 1 
Obtained Results Analyzing Different Situations on an Apache 2.2.22 Web Server for 
T = 600 seconds. 
Attack Slowloris SlowReq Slow Read SlowDrop Slow Next 
Expl. Timeout req req resp resp next 
N max 150 150 150 150 100 
DoS 
√ √ √ √ 
✕ 
C → S pkts 1376 1915 4989 1129 27424 
B 138518 129132 469992 142187 2632774 
bps 1846.91 1721.76 6266.56 1895.83 35103.65 
S → C pkts 1184 1701 4667 2348 13976 
B 79360 113474 3373556 2022042 5132705 
bps 1058.13 1512.99 44980.75 26960.56 68436.07 
Total pkts 2560 3616 9656 3477 41400 
B 217878 242606 3843548 2164229 7765479 









































































































Timeout equal to 4 seconds. Attacks were configured to send de-
fault payload messages. 
The server has been configured to serve at most (the default
value of) N server = 150 simultaneous connections. During our tests,
we have configured the attack tools to establish and maintain alive
such amount of connections with the victim, which represents the
minimum amount of connections needed to potentially cause a de-
nial of service on the targeted server. Indeed, under these condi-
tions, an additional connection would not reach the listening dae-
mon until an already established connection is closed. Neverthe-
less, by default, the maximum number of persistent simultaneous
connections is equal to N persistent = 100 . Therefore, concerning Slow
Next only, without varying default configuration of the host, we
have configured the attack to establish in this case N persistent si-
multaneous connections with the server. In virtue of this, since the
default Apache2 configuration is adopted, the Slow Next attack is
not able to cause a denial of service on the server. Nevertheless,
in our scenario, the attack is able to seize a considerable amount
of resources of the victim, hence reducing its ability to manage le-
gitimate connections. Because of this, and since it is considered an
important slow DoS threat [9] , we have included it into the tests
as well. 
4.5.3. Obtained results 
We define N max the maximum number of simultaneous con-
nections established by the attacks. For each scenario, we con-
sidered client-to-server ( C → S ), server-to-client ( S → C ), and ag-
gregate/total communications. The results we obtained during the
tests are shown in Table 1 . 
The obtained results show that all the attacks successfully es-
tablish the predefined amount of connections with the server.
Therefore, as expected, except in case of Slow Next, a DoS is al-
ways reached on the server. 
Comparing the results of SlowDrop to Slow Next, it is clear
that bandwidth requirements are extremely lower for the proposed
threat. In addition, as previously mentioned, SlowDrop is able to
successfully carry out a denial of service on the victim, while Slow
Next leads the server to a “partial DoS”. 
Considering instead SlowDrop versus Slow Read, although the
same timeout is exploited by both the threat, in this case also,
SlowDrop required bandwidth is considerably lower. This result
should be interpreted as an important achievement, since in the
context of attacks exploiting the resp parameter, the proposed
threat represents an innovative attack making use of lower amount
of bandwidth than other similar threats. 
Regarding Slowloris and SlowReq, their exploitation of the req 
parameter makes such threats require particularly low amounts of
network bandwidth. This is a recognized characteristic of these of-
fensive tools [8,27] . These results were therefore expected. Nev-
ertheless, results show that analyzing the number of exchangedackets, the results we obtained are similar for all the threats.
herefore, anomaly detection systems such as [30] , identifying
nomalies on exchanged packets may not reveal a running Slow-
rop attack, especially considering that among the considered at-
acks, SlowDrop is associated to the lowest amount of client-to-
erver packets. 
Moreover, if we analyze the behavior of the threats, it is well-
nown that the Wait Timeout parameter makes existent timeout
xploiting DoS attacks repeatedly execute short attack bursts, fol-
owed by inactivity periods [8] . This characteristic is not associated
o the proposed SlowDrop, which is instead related to a continu-
us traffic, more similar to a legitimate one. Fig. 11 reports the net-
ork traffic flow in terms of exchanged packets, comparing Slow-
rop with Slowloris and SlowReq. 
As shown in Fig. 11 , Slowloris and SlowReq threats are char-
cterized by short attack bursts/peaks, corresponding to the Wait
imeout expirations. Instead, SlowDrop traffic is distributed in a
ore uniform way during the time. Comparison with Slow Read
nd Slow Next (not reported in Fig. 11 , for readability reasons) ev-
denced instead a network traffic flow similar to SlowDrop. The
etwork traffic flow characteristics, not characterized by peaks, in
onjunction to the ability of SlowDrop to successfully carry out an
ttack, make the proposed threat more dangerous and more diffi-
ult to counter. 
Finally, concerning SlowDrop only, Fig. 11 shows that the pack-
ts flow is slowed down during the time, as a consequence of the
ropping activities. In addition, results reported in Table 1 prove
hat an important characteristic of SlowDrop is related to the
symmetry between incoming ( C → S ) and outgoing ( S → C ) band-
idth, from the server point of view. This characteristic should not
e underestimated, since protection systems often assume as le-
itimate the outgoing traffic flow of the server. In virtue of the
etrieved results, the proposed SlowDrop threat should be consid-
red extremely dangerous. In addition, although it is associated to
igher bandwidth consumption, its ability to adapt on the network
f the attacker ( network independence ) makes such threat able to
uccessfully perpetrate an attack even on extremely slow connec-
ions. 
. Attack detection and mitigation 
Concerning denial of service threats detection and mitigation,
t is important to distinguish between DoS attacks and Distributed
oS (DDoS) attacks. While in the former case a single attacking
ost is involved in the malicious activity, in the latter case more
odes are (willingly or not) involved in the attack. It should be
oted that the execution of a non distributed SlowDrop attack
ould be associated to a single IP address, the one of the attack-
ng node: since SlowDrop exploits the TCP protocol to reach the
istening daemon on the victim host, connections have to be ac-
ually established with the server, and, unlike flooding attacks, IP
poofing activities have to be excluded here, hence exposing the
ttacking host on the network. Therefore, considering standalone
oS attacks, it’s possible to efficiently detect and mitigate a run-
ing SlowDrop attack by analyzing clients IP addresses of the re-
eived packets. For instance, it’s possible to limit the number of
imultaneous connections associated to a common IP address, in
rder to maintain reachability on the server. This approach is par-
icularly effective and it could involve network firewall devices, or
he server itself, through appropriate software or modules [29] . Al-
hough this node may be directly used by the real perpetrator, an
stute attacker may expose a third party (infected) node instead
f his own machine. This characteristic is shared with many other
low DoS Attacks, such as timeout based threats like Slowloris,
low Read, or Slow Next [8] . 
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s  Although during our tests we have considered a DoS attack exe-
uted from a single attacking host associated to a single IP address,
t should be simple to distribute the attack on many machines, ex-
cuting a coordinated malicious activity against a common server
ystem. In this case, attack detection and mitigation is more diffi-
ult, as it’s particularly difficult to distinguish between a legitimate
ituation or a malevolent one [37,60] . Slow DoS Attacks are indeed
specially difficult to counter, due to the reduced attack bandwidth
nd behavior, similar to a fair one, analyzing packets payload or
he shape of the generated traffic. 
Regarding SlowDrop, we have the following facts that should be
onsidered for an efficient attack detection and mitigation: 
• sent and received payload is legitimate, since it’s composed of
legitimate requests and responses. Attack detection/mitigation
should therefore not be based on analyzing the payload di-
rected to the application daemon; 
• as previously described, the same packet dropping characteris-
tics may be related to legitimate clients connected through a
weak link. This fact makes detection particularly challenging,
since an appropriate detection system should be able to dis-
tinguish a SlowDrop attack from those legitimate clients; 
• the induced anomaly is related to communications coming
from the server, while, typically, attacks tend to generate
anomalies on data sent by the client/attacker. In virtue of
this, a detection/mitigation system should appropriately con-
sider server-to-client communications. 
Although, to the best of our knowledge, an efficient detection
nd mitigation system against a distributed execution of Slow-
rop is still missing, promising algorithms in this context (such as
he ones proposed in [13,30,46] ), involving research areas such as
tatistics, machine learning, neural networks, and spectral analysis,
ay be adapted to efficiently protect a network system from the
roposed threat. . Conclusions 
In this paper we proposed an innovative slow DoS threat at-
acking application servers called SlowDrop. The possible range of
argets of SlowDrop is very wide, ranging from simple personal
ervers to widely used services on the Internet, or even critical
nfrastructure system services. Targeted services are based on the
CP protocol. Samples of such services are HTTP, SMTP, or SSH. We
escribed in detail how SlowDrop works, proposing different pos-
ible implementations, the limits of the attack, and illustrating the
ffects of SlowDrop on the victim host. Since the attack may work
t the operating system level (or at the network level, if deployed
n a network tap), it should be considered particularly dangerous:
or instance, a malicious kernel software upgrade may be released,
hus recruiting thousands (or even millions) of attacking nodes un-
illingly becoming part of a botnet. In this case, the eyes of the
ecruited user, the attack effects may be visible only as an, even
xtreme, reduction of the network bandwidth. 
In order to execute accurate tests, we identified appropriate at-
ack parameters, by analyzing how the success of SlowDrop varies
y changing those parameters. We then targeted a common web
erver vulnerable to similar slow DoS threats and we observed
hat the proposed attack can successfully lead to a DoS on the
erver, hence presenting results similar to other available Slow
oS Attacks. We also analyzed the success of the attack when it
s executed from different networks, by considering both wired
nd wireless (Wi-Fi, 3G/HSPA, 4G/LTE) networks, obtaining that by
hanging the network, attack parameters may change accordingly.
xtension to the work may be focused on an accurate identification
nd categorization of packet discarding ratio values, in function of
he characteristic of the adopted communication medium. Addi-
ional work may also be focused on deeply analyzing and mod-
ling the effects of the attack on the server, in case of wireless
etwork connections, by properly considering wireless properties
uch as signal strength, interferences, or wireless network load. 
We also executed tests against Microsoft IIS, a proprietary web
erver not vulnerable to the majority of slow DoS attacks, due to









































































































its requests handling procedures. We obtained that SlowDrop is al-
most always successful, but its success depends on various factors,
internally implemented on the implementation by Microsoft. In-
deed, being the software proprietary, it is more difficult to identify
the source of the triggers that makes the server close malicious
connections. Our approach is based on some sort of network level
reverse engineering , where we analyzed the behavior of the server
during the attack, in order to deduce the internal working of the
system. Further work could therefore concern a deeper analysis of
the server’s ability to respond to a running attack, by also defining
in detail the adopted approach, and to execute additional experi-
ments in order to validate our hypothesis. 
Additional tests we have executed were focused on a com-
parison between SlowDrop and other similar slow DoS threats,
in terms of success of the attack, required bandwidth, and gen-
erated amounts of packets. The obtained results show that, al-
though required bandwidth is higher than other threats such as
Slowloris, the attack is successful and its behavior is not character-
ized by traffic peaks like for other Slow DoS Attacks, hence result-
ing more similar to a legitimate traffic. Additional tests in this topic
may concern the comparison with other unconsidered threats, or,
similarly to the work reported in [29] , on analyzing the success
of SlowDrop when targeting a protected server. Similarly, further
work may be directed to adopt the concepts behind SlowDrop to
exploit systems serving resources of small size, like common web
pages or simple texts. 
In addition, further work may be directed to the execution of
SlowDrop on transmission protocols different from TCP. For in-
stance, it may be interesting to analyse how SlowDrop behaves on
the Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) protocol [4] , an UDP
based protocol proposed by Google to reduce retrieval time of web
resources. Finally, additional work on the topic may be focused on
a proper design and proposal of an innovative detection and miti-
gation system. Being the attack an innovative threat able to target
previously rarely considered systems, it is fundamental to define
appropriate protection systems able to counter SlowDrop. 
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